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FACTS 
Respondent's brief contains statements which are in error and 
require clarification or verification by Appellant for the benefit of the 
Court. Respondent states in its brief at page 5, "the Court issued a 
Temporary Restraining Order against Reichert on March 28, 1984." This 
statement is incorrect. Regional Sales, as Plaintiff, filed a Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction with the trial court. (R 13-1J5) The Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction was denied after evidentiary hearing before Judge 
Croft. (See Memorandum Decision R. 48-50, R 61-66) 
The record regarding and chronology of Defendant's motions to 
amend his counterclaim need clarification. The first Amendment to 
Counterclaim of Defendant was filed on April 30, 1987 (R. 132-133), and 
was for the purpose of adding the affirmative defense of failure of 
consideration based on the documentary information obtained at the 
deposition of Helen Kiholm taken shortly before on April 23, 1987. The 
documentation consisted mainly of the corporate tax returns and earnings 
of Regional Sales Corporation, which documents were presented in the trial 
before Judge Russon. Reichert deemed the Amendment to the 
Counterclaim appropriate in view of paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint 
which alleged "all conditions precedent to Defendant's liability under the 
agreement have been performed or have occurred." ^Paragraph 9 was 
summarily denied, R. 29, paragraph 4 of Answer) Inherent in this 
allegation is the argument that Regional Sales alleged full performance on 
its part under the 1979 agreement. Denial of that paragraph, and the 
claims of the Counterclaim as first submitted placed the performance of 
Regional Sales under the alleged 1979 agreement at issue. The 
documentation obtained at the deposition of Helen Kiholm, which had not 
been previously available although it had been requested by Defendant, 
clearly indicated that Regional Sales had failed to pay the 40% commission 
earned by Mr. Reichert from 1977 through 1983, as required by the 
alleged agreement of 1979. This argument was clearly set forth in the 
Amendment to Counterclaim. (R. 132) 
Respondent, Regional Sales, at page six of its brief takes issue with 
the statement of Reichert regarding the basis upon which Judge Russon 
recused himself. Regional Sales states that Reichert's contentions are not 
true, to wit: Judge Russon recused himself "due to the evasive conduct of 
Mrs. Kiholm while testifying and the responsive conduct of counsel." For 
whatever importance this issue may have to this Court, Mr. Reichert calls 
attention to the record in this matter, beginning at the transcript page 
number 77: 
THE COURT: Mr. Fankhauser, I want you to 
wait for the witness. You keep speaking over. 
Let me say this: If you are trying to make the 
trier of fact understand what you are trying to 
get at, you are not doing too red hot of a job. 
You cut in so. Then, I cannot understand what 
the answer is, and I don't know what she has said. 
I have gone on like this for a page an a half. You 
need to ask questions and let her answer. 
FANKHAUSER: What I am having a problem 
with, the witness does not respond to the question. 
She gives me a narrative. 
THE COURT: I have heard a lot of narratives 
in Court and that certainly is objectionable if she 
does that. She needs to answer your question. 
Sometimes when she is answering your question, 
she gets about four words out, you cut her off and 
go right on to something else. I won't argue with 
you. Move on and do what I am saying. 
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FANKHAUSER: I am explaining why " i 
doing what I am doing. 
THE COURT: Let's call a recess and I will see 
both counsel in chambers. 
- ». , in chambers, Judge Russon made an offer to 
recuse himself from the , ase, as substantiated at page 72 of the 
^ follows: 
THE COURT: We had a meeting in chambers. 
I have offered to Mr. Fankhauser as settlemeru 
recusal. He has asked me to recuse myself and I 
will do that. The case is terminated *t rhi« noint. 
Based upon the transcript of the proceedings before Judge Russon, as cited, 
the statement of Respondent and footnote 1 of its br\--r ire incorrect 
ng the recusal of Judge Russon, Def< iew moi 
to Amend Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim, pursuant to Rule 15, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which motion was timely filed. At that 
time Delendant proposed amending his Answer and Counterclaim to 
include failure of consideration and, for the first time, the affirmative 
defense of hre ,n I >K I'U> '>I > I Ins motion ',»,as filed 
.?'.! 1987, several months prior to liuil before Judge Brian. 
Mr. Reichert wishes to clarify the giving of jury instructions in 
response to the arguments of Regional Sales th >r when 11 
court failed to give instruction number eigh -miction number eight is 
found at R. 18"" 1 "hi<-> requested instruction was submitted on December 
request*. 
•J -*••*«'!> December io 1987. and requested that its instruction 
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number eighteen be given if the court refused to give number eight. The 
court below thereafter made the substitution as requested. Therefore, the 
instruction actually given to which Regional Sales objects pertaining to 
liquidated damages is its own instruction. 
Finally, regarding Regional Sales arguments for attorney's fees, this 
Court should carefully note several important deficiencies in Mr. Roe's 
affidavit for fees. (R. 313-315) Paragraph four of the affidavit 
acknowledges that he was unable to obtain the actual hours worked during 
the period of January 24, 1984 to December 31,1985, while he was at Roe 
& Fowler. Instead, he "estimated" the figure of 42 hours, all of which 
apply to the failed attempt at an injunction and related matters. Mr. Roe 
states that his customary rate is $130 per hour, but fails to even allege that 
this is a reasonable rate for the services performed, the complexity of the 
case, or that the rate is reasonable when compared to other rates in the area 
for similar work. Instead, he simply states a self-interested opinion that the 
hours billed and the rate charged are reasonable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Judge Brian's Failure to Grant Reichert's Motion to Amend the 
Counterclaim, made pursuant to Rule 15. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Constituted an Abuse of Discretion 
As has been previously argued, Judge Brian's failure to grant 
Reichert's Motion to Amend Counterclaim constituted an abuse of 
discretion . The denial of the motion was not in the interests of justice and 
did not promote a trial on the merits of the case, but summarily dismissed 
important claims of Reichert for affirmative relief. Furthermore, Judge 
Brian, relying on the previous ruling of Judge Russon regarding the 
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amendment of Reichert's Counterciai .. e^ into consideration, Kit!" 
fact that Judge Russon, had not ever ruled on Reicheifs claim,, of breach, of 
a further abuse of discretion I he motion to amend should have been 
granted, and Reichert should have had his day in court Certainly, the 
granting ml I In inolion SMIIIIII have HimiiialH |H , , , K i%l notenlial 
ion regarding the use of parol evidence n; ijan.m* whether or not the 
1979 agreement was a sham. The jury verdict should stand, or in the 
s 
counterclaim for breach of contract, which remedy the Court of Appeals 
improperly denied. 
I H3I1 i I Ill 
Regional Sales incorrectly asserts that its performance under the 
1979 agreement was not at issi le This Court may note that the bulk, of Mr.* 
Reichert's defense and case rested upon claims that the performance of 
Regional Sales was at issue, and that they had not performed under the 
nil mi effort Hi roiih J (he prima facie case of Regional Sales foi breach of 
contract on his pari, The breach of regional Sales was committed from 
W O 
i \ * pay the 40% commissions to Reichert in that time, but 
' *?d to operate under the previous oral agreement to the end of 1,982, 
VVMIVII |PM>vided thai Rrii hnl would In |MIN1 A Siiliiy SMIH1 lln hirrichof 
Regional Sales preceded that alleged against Reichert, and since the 
agreement of 1,979 was a sham, Reichert was relieved of performance 
arguments before, during and after trial. Regional Sales was therefore not 
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entitled to damages at all. Such a denial of damages going to Regional 
Sales constitutes a straightforward "negative" defense by Reichert. 
Negative defenses do not require separate pleading, as do affirmative 
defenses. In this sense, set off and recoupment may or may not require 
separate pleading, depending on the manner of their use. If they are used 
to seek an affirmative recovery, they require a separate pleading. If they 
are used in a purely defensive manner, i.e., to address the prima facie 
elements of Plaintiffs case, or used to defend against the allegations raised 
by Plaintiff, then they do not require separate pleading under rule 8(c), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Professor Moore states, regarding pleading of "affirmative defenses" 
not listed in Rule 8(c): 
An analysis of Plaintiffs Prima Facie case is 
necessary in applying the [clause in Rule 8(c) 
which requires affirmative pleading of "any other 
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense"]. Any matter that does not tend to 
controvert the opposing parties prima facie case 
as determined by applicable substantive law 
should be pleaded, and is not put in issue by a 
denial made pursuant to Rule 8(b). 
Moore. Pleading and Procedure, at 8-182. commenting on Rule 8, Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Therefore, the definition of a negative defense is one raised by mere 
denials, which address the prima facie claims of Regional Sales. Insofar as 
set off and recoupment were used by Reichert to mitigate or deny the 
damages claimed by Regional Sales, they constituted negative defenses 
raised by Reichert's denials. Evidence supportive of these denials was 
properly admitted, even though the same evidence could be also used to 
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support an affirmative claim for relief. The verdict of the jury was not 
therefore tainted by the admission of evidence by Reichert relating to the 
failure of performance of Regional Sales. The Court of Appeals erred in 
finding that such evidence was improperly admitted and in holding that it 
confused the jury, and in further holding that Reichert, on remand, would 
not be allowed to use such evidence, even in a purely defensive manner. 
If, contrary to Reichert's contentions, this Court holds that Reichert 
was required to affirmatively plead breach of contract and that his motion 
to include this in his counterclaims was properly denied, we must examine 
the effect of a failure to plead. Professor Moore states: 
If an affirmative defense is not pleaded it is 
waived to the extent that the party who should 
have pleaded the affirmative defense may not 
introduce evidence in support thereof. 
Moore at 8-184. 
If Reichert failed to plead an affirmative defense in claiming set off 
and recoupment, nevertheless, he was free to use any and all evidence 
provided by Regional Sales to advance his claims, and would have been 
limited only to the extent that he attempted to introduce his own 
independent evidence. 
Regional Sales contentions that the admission of exhibit "I" 
constituted error are not well founded in view of the fact that they were all 
based upon evidence provided by Regionals Sales which was previously 
admitted. Exhibit "I" (see T. 175-182) was based upon invoices maintained 
by Regional Sales for the year 1981. Exhibit 10, introduced by Regional 
Sales also involved the use of those invoices used by Reichert. (T. 219-227, 
especially 221 and 226-7) Therefore, Exhibit "I" is merely a reliance upon 
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evidence before the jury in the form of Exhibit 10. Reichert was therefore 
entitled to introduce Exhibit "I" and argue its contents, in spite of 
contentions of failure to plead breach of contract as an affirmative defense 
or claim. 
POINT III 
There was no Error in Giving Instruction Eighteen in Place of Requested 
Instruction Eight. 
Regional Sales complains of error in the giving of instruction 
eighteen in place of requested instruction eight. As has been previously 
mentioned, Instruction eighteen was suggested by Regional Sales in the 
event that number eight was not given. According to Utah law, this does 
not constitute appealable error: 
Under Utah law, a party on appeal may not assign 
as error either the giving or failure to give an 
instruction unless he first proposes correct 
instructions, and should the court fail to give 
them, to then except thereto. 
Snyderville Transp. Co.. Inc. v. Christiansen. 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980). 
Since Regional Sales requested replacement instruction (number 
eighteen) was in fact given, there was not appealable error. The jury 
verdict should therefore be allowed to stand. 
Conclusion 
In addition to those arguments and points previously made by 
Reichert, this reply brief supplements and clarifies the issues of this appeal 
in several importance regards. First, the Motion to Amend Counterclaim 
was wrongfully denied by Judge Brian. It was made well in advance of 
trial before Judge Brian, and did not result in prejudice since the 
10 
performance of Regional Sales was already contested by the original 
Answer and Counterclaim. Furthermore, it contained the claim of breach 
of contract, which Judge Brian did not address, but which was never before 
raised in pleadings or otherwise. Second, Set off and recoupment were 
proper issues before the trier of fact and addressed the very heart of 
Regional Sales claims, which were denied in the Answer and Counterclaim 
originally filed by Reichert. Third, the giving of Jury instruction eighteen 
was not appealable error since it was the requested replacement of Regional 
Sales itself. Fourth, as has been pointed out in the Statement of Facts, the 
affidavit of Mr. Roe regarding attorney's fees was wholly deficient in 
several important regards, as stated in the cases previously cited, including 
Trayner v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984), and Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), which summarizes the law of Trayner 
and previous cases on this point. 
The Court of Appeals erred in placing itself in the stead of the trier 
of fact. Again Reichert would remind this Court and counsel that the 
verdict herein was a "black box" general verdict, and not a special verdict. 
Therefore, the risk of substituting the appellate court's judgment 
improperly for that of the trier or fact runs high. The jury verdict should 
stand. If, however, this case is again remanded, Mr. Reichert should be 
given the opportunity to have his day in court, to make his claims and 
counterclaims, and to allow fairness and justice, to be served thereby. 
Respectfully submitted this 
n 
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